Next time must be different. CEPS Commentaries, 4 November 2009 by Gros, Daniel.
 
Daniel Gros is Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. This Commentary also 
appeared as the lead editorial in CEPS News, November 2009. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. The 
views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution 
with which he is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2009 
Next time must be different 
Daniel Gros 
4 November 2009 
y finally signing the Lisbon Treaty, Czech President Václav Klaus brought to an anti-climatic 
close years of protracted and often acrimonious negotiations to overhaul the European Union’s 
institutional infrastructure. The EU's reform treaty is now fully ratified and is expected to enter 
into force on 1 December 2009. However frustrating and bruising the ratification experience may have 
been, it is hoped that the whole saga will have the unintended (but finally, positive) consequence of 
strengthening the determination of those wishing to ensure that the next round of treaty change can enter 
into force even if one or more member countries is not willing or able to agree to it. 
The situation in the Czech Republic was entirely different from that of Ireland, where the political class, 
which had embraced the Lisbon Treaty, clearly failed in the first referendum to convince its own public 
constituency of the text’s merits. But the large majority (over two-thirds) voting in favour of the treaty 
the second time around showed that, once properly explained, the document could command broad 
popular support. 
In the Czech Republic the treaty was approved by Parliament with a large majority – a majority that 
would have been sufficient to change the country’s Constitution. Moreover, there were no indications 
that the general public was against the treaty. President Klaus was elected by Parliament, and he is not 
responsible for the European policy of his country. The reasons he gave for his reluctance to sign the 
Treaty (notably the fear of massive property claims from Germans relating to the so-called ‘Benes 
decree’) all concerned issues that had been debated and laid to rest several times before, for example 
when the Czech Republic joined the EU and when the Czech Parliament overwhelmingly approved the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
Worryingly, however, Václav Klaus is not just one individual case. He is part of a larger phenomenon, 
namely the mis-functioning of democracy in the new member countries. Other manifestations include the 
recent fall of the government in Romania, the stridently anti-European rhetoric of the Kazcyński brothers 
in Poland and the rise of ultra-right parties in the Baltics. The scope and seriousness of these examples 
suggest that these problems might persist for quite some time and might repeat themselves in the next 
round of new member states from Southeastern Europe. 
By the time the Lisbon Treaty needs to be revised, it is likely that the EU will be even larger, probably 30 
or more member countries, and even more diverse. The next treaty revision must thus be prepared in 
such a way that it goes forward even if there are difficulties in one or two member countries. The text 
should thus contain a clause to the effect that it will enter into force among those members that have 
ratified within a certain date if these countries constitute a super-majority, say 90%, both in terms of 
population and the total number of member states. The treaty itself would still be negotiated with the aim 
of obtaining the consent of all governments, but such a clause would protect the others from being held 
hostage to the fall-out from political infighting or posturing by some leaders in weaker member states. 
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